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1 Introduction
The recent scientific literature has proven that some chemicals, usually known as “Endocrine Disruptors” (EDs),
may have harmful effects on humans’ endocrine system. Given that EDs interfere with the human endocrine
system, the exposure to these chemicals may have long-lasting effects on individuals and even have conse-
quences on future generations (e.g. via in utero exposure). Moreover, EDs can have strong, negative and long
lasting consequences for the environment and in particular for the reproduction of certain species.
The growing concern about the negative effects on human health and on the environment brought about by
EDs has prompted the EU to take action and to introduce specific legislative provisions aimed at reducing human
and environmental exposure.
Indeed, the implementation of restrictions on the use of certain chemicals might influence not only the
production process but also the commercialization of the final products interested by the regulation. In particular,
the ban could work as a non-tariff measure and potentially modify trade relationships between EU Member
States and third countries not subject to the same regulatory interventions.
The aim of this study is to address the potential unintended consequences that EU Regulation on EDs could
have had on trade patterns between Europe and the rest of the world. More precisely, the analysis sheds some
light on the possibility that the regulation hampered the exporting capacity of European countries.
The analysis focuses on two legislative initiatives related to EDs, namely, the group of regulatory interventions
implemented since 1999 to control the use of certain low-molecular weight phthalates misuse and the restriction
on the UV-filter 3-benzylidene camphor (3-BC) under the cosmetic products regulation enforced in 2016.
The study considers trade flow patterns occurring between EU Member States and the rest of the world,
before and after the onset of the EU regulatory interventions. The model accounts for various sources of
heterogeneity, which might be due to importer- and exporter-specific characteristics, common temporal shocks
and time-invariant qualities of each commodity, plus a set of geographical and socio-economic attributes which
can vary across countries or pair of partner countries (e.g. distance, GDP, whether importer and exporter share
a common language or a trade agreement, etc.). Thus, the estimates presented in this report are intended as
net of these factors.
Since data on trade is aggregated at the level of commodity, the identification of the exact amount of goods
containing low-molecular weight phthalates or 3-BC is not feasible.1 For this reason, the estimates presented
in this report identify changes in trade flows for a group of goods that is larger than the one actually addressed
by the interventions, especially for 3-BC. The commodity used to capture changes in the use of phthalates is the
one containing plasticisers. Variations in the flows of goods containing 3-BC are measured in terms of traded
cosmetics and toilet preparations for the care of skin.
The first part of the study concerning phthalates shows that the volume of traded plasticisers involving EU
Member States has decreased in the years following 1999, that is when a number of restrictions on the use of
certain low-molecular weight phthalates were put in place. While the timing of the different regulatory policy
changes does not allow a causal interpretation of this negative relationship, the results are consistent with a
decrease in the amount of plasticisers traded among EU Member States (and with non-EU partner countries)
during the early 2000s.
In the second part of the analysis, where the 3-BC ban under the Cosmetic Products Regulation is investigated,
the volumes of traded cosmetics for EU Member States appear to increase significantly both with respect to the
flows occurring among non-EU countries and to the intra-EU flows referred to a comparison commodity. The
estimated positive and statistically significant effect is consistent both with manufacturers in Europe adjusting
to the higher standards, and consequently boosting the value of the traded goods within this category, and with
a change in the behaviour of European consumers, which might have increased their preferences for products
made in the EU over those imported from outside Europe.
It is important to emphasize that the effectiveness and the efficacy of such interventions in addressing
their primary goal, i.e. the protection of the environment and of European citizens’ health, are not questioned.
Instead, this report aims provides evidence on how legislative initiatives motivated by environmental and health
concerns impact on the functioning of the internal market in the context of global trade flows.
The remainder of the report is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to the presentation of the
gravity model, that is, the empirical framework adopted in the analysis. Section 3 describes the data used and
Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the details of the first case study - namely, the
interventions limiting the use of phthalates - and the empirical evidence related to it. Section 6 briefly describes
the restriction on the UV-filter 3-benzylidene camphor (3-BC) under the cosmetic products regulation and offers
the quantitative results of its assessment. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
1 This also implies that it is not possible to compute the share of these goods over the total value of the commodity, nor establishing
whether this varies over time.
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2 The gravity model with DiD
Since many years, the international trade literature has adopted the so-called gravity model to explain trade
dynamics between countries and to estimate the trade impacts of various trade-related policies. Gravity models
relate the magnitude of trade between countries to a series of country-specific characteristics - notably, their
economic size and level of economic development - and to factors stimulating or discouraging the movement of
products between countries. The latter include transportation costs, usually proxied by the presence or absence
of a shared land border and by geographic distance, and informal and formal trade barriers, often proxied by
the existence of a common language and by the presence of free trade agreements.
Among other applications, gravity models have been used to evaluate trade under Non-Tariff Measures
(NTM, hereafter). Results on the effects of NTM on trade flows are mixed. Older contributions from the trade
literature show that NTM are trade-impeding (Henson and Loader, 2001; Otsuki et al., 2001). However, recent
studies suggest that NTM such as the introduction of product standards, do not have a consistently negative
effect on trade and, on the contrary, they potentially enhance it (Colen et al., 2012; Shepherd and Wilson, 2013).
Even though the analysis of this report takes inspiration from this literature, the principal goal here is to
shed light on the causal impact of the implementation of the interventions on two endocrine disruptors chemical
on the trade flows of targeted countries (EU member states) with respect to non-affected ones.
Among the available econometricmethods for non-experimental causal inference the Difference-in-Difference
(DiD) approach is the one which better suits the institutional setting under investigation. DiD method compares
the change from before to after the implementation of a policy on a selected outcome (e.g. trade flows) of a
treated group of units/countries relative to the same change from before to after the policy of a control group
of units/countries considered as a good counterfactual (Card and Krueger, 1994).
As detailed in Section 4, following some recent examples (Chen et al., 2018; Tello, 2015), this report aims at
adopting the DiD methodology within a gravity framework in order to evaluate the effect of the introduction of
the regulatory initiatives mentioned above on EU countries’ trade flows.
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3 The Data
Analyses are carried out on a panel dataset of worldwide bilateral import trade flows (in current US dollars) of
some specific commodities that have been affected by ED-related interventions. In addition, we collect worldwide
import trade flows of a few products within the same economic sector of those interested by the interventions,
which may be considered completely unaffected because they do not include the restricted substance under
consideration. The import data were retrieved from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database
(UN COMTRADE) for the years running from 1995 to 2018.2
Additionally, we collect data on control variables that are typically included in standard gravity models,
such as the GDP, the size and the population levels of both countries, the geographical distance between them,
whether they share a common language or (past or current) colonial ties. These variables were collected from
CEPII and the World Bank.
2 UN COMTRADE provides data on both import and export flows. In theory, country A reported imports from country B would match with
country B reported exports to country A. However, as suggested by the World Bank (see this report) this is not always the case for several
reasons and the difference between the two measures is between 10% and 20%. In particular, imports are usually recorded with more
accuracy than exports because imports generate tariff revenues while exports do not. For this reason the report focuses on import trade
flows only.
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4 Empirical Framework
The empirical analysis consists in estimating the following gravity Difference-in-Differences (DiD) model:
ln(flowijct) = β1Postijct + β2Treatijc + β3Postijct × Treatijc
+αi + αj + αt + αc +
∑
γmXijct + εijct
(1)
where flowijct denotes the trade flow of commodity c in year t between reporting country (importer) i and
partner country (exporter) j . The Postijct variable is a dummy indicator which takes value 1 in the years when
the Regulation was in place. Treatijc is a dummy variable that defines whether a given unit belongs to the
treatment (in which case, it is equal to 1) or to the control group (in which case it takes value 0). The coefficient
of interest is β3, that is the one associated to the interaction between the Treatijc and Postijct. This captures
the average effect on given trade flow -between country i and country j- being subject to the intervention with
respect to not being affected by it.
Heterogeneity is controlled for by including a comprehensive set of fixed effects: importer and exporter fixed
effects (αi and αj ); year fixed effects (αt) to capture potential common shocks that hit all countries at the
same time; and commodity fixed effects (αc) which account for time-invariant heterogeneities that are specific
to each commodity.
The set Xijt comprises a number of variables that are typically included in gravity models to control for
the characteristics of countries i and j and for the trade specificities of each partnership. These encompass
measures of GDP, population levels, distance between countries, the relative size of the respective internal
markets (Areai ∗Areaj ) and indicators for contiguity, common language and colonial ties.3
In addition, the setXijt includes a multilateral trade resistance term for both the importing and the exporting
country which proxy the “remoteness” of i and j, respectively, compared to all other countries.4 The set Xijt
also contains dummy variables for the most relevant Regional Trade Agreements in place during the period of
analysis as it is standard in the gravity literature.5
The unbalanced sample used in the analysis could be subject to a non-ignorable selection rule (e.g. trade
flows for a given country-pair might be zero in some years), thus introducing selection bias in the estimates.
For this reason, we follow Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and adopt a correction method which approximates the
Heckman Inverse Mills Ration (IMR) term by adding two variables that reflect each country-pair presence in the
sample (Guillotin and Sevestre, 1994). These consist of the number of years of presence of the country-pair in
the considered sample (Presij ) and a dummy variable for the presence of a non-zero trade flow in year t − 1
(PAijt). Finally, εijct is the error term.
This general framework is used to assess both case studies this report deals with, namely, the interventions
regulating certain low-molecular weight phthalates and the EU-wide ban on 3-BC. In particular, the estimation
strategy relies on the definition of two alternative control groups.
The first scenario contemplates trade flows occurring within the EU only and compares trade flows of the
commodity affected by the intervention to those of a comparable commodity which was not subject to the same
change in rules. Thus, the control group is composed of trade flows of this latter commodity within the EU.
In the second scenario, which only looks at the commodity that is affected by the intervention, world-wide
trade flows are considered. Thus, the treated trade flows are those where at least one partner is a EU Member
State, while the control group is made of exchanges among countries that do not belong to the EU.
The two specifications of the model are further described below.
4.1 First scenario: within-EU market only, affected vs non affected commodities
The first scenario considers trade flows among EU Member States only and two different commodities: one that
is affected by the entry into force of the Regulation in a given year and another that is not subject to any change
in rules.
3 These latter indicators consist of dummy variables that take value 1 if the following occurs (and value 0 otherwise): i and j share
a common border (Contiguityij ); i and j share a common language (CommonLanguageij ); i and j have had a common coloniser at
any time after 1945 (CommonColonyij ); i and j have had a colonial relationship at any time after 1945 (1945Colonyij ); i and j are
currently in a colonial relationship (CurrentColonyij ).
4 Following Baier and Bergstrand (2002), we compute Ri(j) as follows: Ri(j) = [
∑(
k N)Yk(Dik)
(1 − σ)]( 1
1−σ where Dij is the
distance between country i and country j, Yk is the log of GDP and σ = 4.
5 These are: Andean, Mercosur, Cacm, Nafta, Efta, Apta, Caricom, Cefta, Eac, Eco, Cemac, Ecowas, Pafta, Safta, Sparteca, Sacu, Sadc,
Cis and Waemu.
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In this setting, the model in Equation 1 becomes:
ln(flowijct) = β1Postct + β2Treatc + β3Postct × Treatc
+αi + αj + αt + αc +
∑
γmXijct + εijct
(2)
where Treatc flags the affected commodity and Postct indicates whether this is regulated in any given year.
The coefficient associated to the interaction Postct × Treatc is the coefficient of interest. This represents the
effect of the Regulation on the value of the trade flows that occur within the EU for the affected commodity, in
comparison to the control.
4.2 Second scenario: world-wide market, affected commodities only
The first scenario outlined above consists of a standard Difference-in-Differences model, which offers a straight-
forward interpretation of the results. However, this approach only considers trade flows that occur within the EU
and does not provide any information on the effects of the Regulation on trade among EU and non-EU countries.
Given that, likely, there is some degree of substitution between exchanges and partner countries, it is important
to observe the phenomenon from a more global perspective.
Thus, the second scenario considers world-wide trade flows of a commodity that is affected by an ED-related
EU Regulation. This implies that all flows occurring within the EU and to/from EU Member States will be affected
(i.e. will be treated), while trade among non-EU countries will not, making this latter category the control group.
To this end, it is important to highlight that whenever a commodity is regulated under this type of rules, its
production, use, trade and sale is completely banned in all EU countries.
According to this scenario, four types of trade flows are considered separately: intra-EU, from EU to non-EU
countries, from non-EU to EU countries and extra-EU. Then, the variable Treatijc of Equation 1 is unpacked into
TreatintraEU,ij , TreatEUimp,ij and TreatEUexp,ij , which are defined as follows:6
— TreatintraEU,ij = 1 if both reporter and partner countries belong to the EU, = 0 otherwise;
— TreatEUimp,ij = 1 when the importer i is EU and exporter country j is non-EU, = 0 otherwise;
— TreatEUexp,ij = 1 when the importer i is non-EU and exporter country j is EU, = 0 otherwise.
As a consequence, the model is extended to the following specification:
ln(flowijt) = β1Postijt + β2TreatintraEU,ij + β3Postijt × TreatintraEU,ij
β4TreatEUimp,ij + β5Postijt × TreatEUimp,ij
β6TreatEUexp,ij + β7Postijt × TreatEUexp,ij
+αi + αj + αt +
∑
γmXijt + εijt
(3)
where coefficients β3, β5 and β7 capture the effect of the Regulation on the trade flows occurring among EU
countries, from EU to non-EU countries and from non-EU to EU countries, respectively, compared to the flows
existing among countries in the rest of the world. In order to account for the impact of the Regulation on trade
flows involving EU countries, regardless of the type of partner, the linear combination of β3, β5 and β7 is also
computed and presented in the tables. This is to be interpreted as the effect of the Regulation on the overall
trade capacity of EU countries (including that with extra-European partners) with respect to flows existing in the
rest of the world.
4.3 Identifying assumption
In Difference-in-Differences models, a causal identification of the impact of an intervention is valid only if the
parallel trends assumption holds. The assumption implies that the average change in trade flows for the treated
units (commodities in the first scenario, countries in the second) is equal to the same change for the control units
in the pre-intervention period. That is, differences between the two groups in the absence of the intervention
are time-invariant: if this is the case, the estimated impact can be fully imputed to the intervention and not to
pre-existing differences between the two groups.
In order to verify the assumption, the gravity DID regression analysis is integrated with an event-study. It
could be expected that if the parallel trends assumption holds, the effect at each lead (t − N , i.e. N periods
before the intervention) to be not statistically different from zero.
6 The index c disappears due to the fact that only the treated commodity is contemplated in this specification of the model. For the
same reason, αc does not appear in Equation 3. The residual category TreatextraEU,ij , which identifies trade flows among non-EU
countries, is left as baseline category and for this reason it does not appear in the model.
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5 The impact of the limitations in the use of phthalates
Phthalates are a group of chemical substances mainly used as plasticiser in plastic material to make it softer
and more flexible. They are mainly used in polyvinyl chloride (PVC) to manufacture a wide range of product types,
including building materials, packaging, films, detergents, toys, personal care products and medical devices. In
particular, bis(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate, also known as DEHP, has been the most used general purpose plasticiser
for the last 50 years and until recent times. In 1997, the estimated tonnage in Western Europe was of 595,000
t/y, of which 78% for indoor and 22% for outdoor applications (ECB 2008).7
Phthalates have proven to be chemicals that pose serious risks for human health because of their reproductive
toxicitymediated by anti-androgenic endocrine effects. Moreover, evidence frommammalian and aquatic species
has also raised concerns on potential risks on metabolic and immune systems and neurological development.8
Upon these evidences, the use of phthalates has been progressively restricted. In 1999 the European
Commission first restricted its use in the production of toys and childcare articles made of soft PVC. In 2005 the
ban was extended to all toys and childcare articles containing more than 0.1% w/w of the plasticiser material.
Since the 1999 EU regulatory action the use of low-molecular weight phthalates has decreased significantly and
production has gradually shifted to higher molecular volume phthalates. In 2011, the Commission decided to act
even more incisively and to add four phthalates to the authorisation list REACH. As a consequence, the chemical
industry was prohibited to adopt the four phthalates unless an application for derogation was presented before
August 2013, with the final sunset date in February 2015.
In order to perform the analysis of the consequences of such legislation on trade flows the analysis focuses
on plasticisers, which constitute the actual material subject to the intervention.9 Indeed, this commodity contains
phthalates as well as non-phthalate plasticisers but other kinds as well. In recent years industry has shifted
from the restricted low-molecular weight to high-molecular weight phthalates and non-phthalates plasticisers.
However, it is worth remembering that DEHP has been the most widely used plasticiser in the last 50 years
and therefore it constituted a large part of the commodity under study. The control commodity in this case is
the polyethylene polymer (PET).10 This is the most commonly used plastic, but it does not contain plasticisers
and hence - although belonging to a closely related industry sector as plasticisers - it is not affected by the
intervention.
To begin with, some descriptive statistics are shown. Then, results deriving from the first scenario are
presented for plasticisers and the polyethylene polymer and their trade within the EU. This is followed by the
analysis under the second scenario, where only plasticisers and world-wide trade flows are considered.
It is worth noting that a causal implication for the parameter of interest is only attributable to the first
intervention in 1999, while the coefficients referred to the post-2005 period are better intended as descriptive
evidence. This is mainly due to the timing of the interventions related to phthalates. Indeed, the time intervals
from one intervention to the other are too narrow to assume that the industry could have reached a steady-state
equilibrium in between. This implies that when the period 2005-2011 is analysed, it is not possible to conclude
that the coefficients are not affected at all by the change in rules that occurred in 1999.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 informs about the yearly average value of trade flows within ij country pairs in the years when the
intervention was not yet in force. The value of yearly transactions was decreasing worldwide, but it is interesting
to note that the number of non-zero transactions (N ) has been steadily rising among non-EU countries (i.e.,
Rest of the World trade), thus contributing to the dynamics of total trade values displayed in Figure 1. For the
same reason, the total volume of trade among non-EU countries is larger than that occurring among EU Member
States, despite the fact that the average yearly flows between EU countries are larger than the exchanges
between non-EU pairs.
The first trading partner in the exchange of plasticiser for EU countries were other EU Member States. In
fact, in 1998, 93% of the value of the good exchanged was among EU countries. By 2014 this percentage did
not change substantially (89%). Moreover, in 1998 the first three non-European trade partners for EU countries
were the USA, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea. In the following years, new chemical actors
entered the market and this changed the trade patterns: by 2014 the first three non-European partners for EU
countries became Argentina, the USA and Brazil.
7 However, the data at hand does not allow determining the amount of phthalates per type of item (e.g. toys of soft PVC).
8 See ECHA (2017). Background document to the to the Opinion on the Annex XV dossier proposing restrictions on four phthalates
(DEHP, BBP, DBP, DIBP). Retrievable from: https://echa.europa.eu/registry-of-restriction-intentions/-/dislist/details/0b0236e1806e7a36
9 In the UN COMTRADE database the plasticiser corresponds to code 381220 (Plasticisers, compound; for rubber or plastics).
10 The UN COMTRADE code for the polyethylene polymer is 3901 (Polymers of ethylene, in primary forms).
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Table 1: Pre-intervention trade values of the plasticiser
1995 1996 1997 1998
Mean Sd N Mean Sd N Mean Sd N Mean Sd N
Intra-EU trade 1114.8 2152.3 94 1090.2 1928.5 78 932.0 1740.5 78 802.5 1563.9 83
EU import 363.9 1394.7 35 374.2 1120.5 37 249.1 500.4 32 118.1 240.9 38
EU export 425.5 1547.1 183 418.9 1523.9 205 326.0 1215.7 212 252.0 1005.4 225
Rest of the World trade 577.6 2588.0 174 520.5 2466.9 207 567.9 2688.6 218 460.7 2230.2 229
Note: figures refer to ij yearly averages and are expressed in thousands of US dollars.
Figure 1: Plasticiser: total value of trade flows trend
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5.2 First scenario: impact of the intervention on plasticisers with respect to
polyethylene polymer, intra-EU trade flows
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of the model where within-EU trade flows of both the plasticisers
and the polyethylene polymer are considered.11 This corresponds to the specification outlined in Section 4.1.
The coefficient associated to the indicator for the enactment of the intervention suggests that on average
trade flows of the plasticiser decrease significantly by around 244% due to the new rules, compared to the trade
of polyethylene polymer, i.e. the commodity that is not subject to them.
In order to verify the parallel trends assumption and to describe the evolution of this effect over time,
Figure 2 shows estimates corresponding to the coefficient presented in Table 2 for each year considered, i.e.
the event study results. From the year 2000 onwards, coefficients suggest a rapid decline in the value of trade
flows of plasticisers within the EU, relative to the comparison good. This trend seems to stabilize around 2004
and to continue being negative for the rest of the period. Interestingly, the announcement and the expiry of the
so-called sunset dates (2011-2015) does not seem to affect the outcome significantly. Possibly, this could be
due to the fact that the market had already adjusted to the prospects of a complete ban on phthalate plasticiser
Table 2: Effect of the intervention on plasticisers on intra-EU trade flows, affected vs non affected commodity
(1)
Variables ln(trade value in USD)
Regulation -2.4380***
(0.1507)
Observations 13,226
Number of ijc combinations 1,142
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
11 For the full list of estimates, which are all in line with the predictions of economic theory, see Table 8 in Section 8.
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in the early 2000s. In addition, this might reveal a substitution towards high-molecular weight plasticisers,
which belong to the same treated commodity (i.e. plasticisers).
As a matter of fact, in the pre-Regulation period (1995-1997), all coefficients are not statistically different
from zero and therefore the identifying assumption is verified. Nonetheless, the point estimates suggest that it
might be the case that trade of plasticisers was already decreasing in comparison to the intra-EU exchanges of
polyethylene polymer.
This might be explained by different reasons. First, it may be because of adjustments of the market that were
antecedent to the first year of observation (1995) most probably due to the emerging scientific evidence and the
growing regulatory scrutiny during the 1990s. Second, the comparison commodity might not correspond to the
ideal control. Third, since this scenario only considers EU-wide trade flows, it could be that relevant exchanges
occurring with countries located outside of the EU are confounding the estimates. The specification of the model
presented in the next subsection aims at discarding these concerns.
Figure 2: Effect of the intervention on plasticisers on intra-EU trade flows, affected vs non affected commodity: event
study
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Note: The y axis expresses the difference in trade flows relative to the year before
the implementation of the intervention. Black dots are the yearly point estimates,
computed as the linear combination of intra-EU, EU import and EU export; the vertical
lines represent the respective confidence intervals at 95% level. The vertical dashed
lines identify the year of enforcement of the various interventions.
5.3 Second scenario: focus on plasticisers, EU vs Non-EU trade flows
Table 3 presents the results on plasticisers following the second model specification outlined in Section 4.2,
where global trade flows are accounted for.12
Column 1 considers all trade flows world-wide (intra-EU, to and from the EU and among extra-EU countries),
for a total of around 2, 850 pairs of countries. The estimated coefficients suggest that, compared to trade
flows among non-EU countries and conditional on each type of trading partnership, the value of the plasticiser
traded by EU countries drops significantly: intra-EU trade and exports by around 34% each and imports by
67%. The result should not come as a surprise considering the staggered implementation of the regulation,
which has progressively tightened over time, thus, giving the possibility to the industry to adapt. It should
also be noted that the United States, an important trading partner for European countries (as highlighted in
Section 5.1), applied increasing restrictions to phthalates in 2008, 2009 and 2012. Therefore, it is possible that
the estimated coefficient responds to changes in the difference in trade flows between EU and non-EU partners
in the post-2008 period.
The overall effect of the regulating intervention on trade flows involving EU countries (i.e. intra-EU trade, EU
import and EU export altogether) can be estimated by linearly combining the three parameters. This yields a
coefficient that is negative and statistically significant at 1% level, which implies a drop in the overall value of
trade for EU countries by 134% in comparison to non-EU trade for the same commodity.
12 For the full list of estimates, which are all in line with the predictions of economic theory, see Table 9 in Section 8.
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Table 3: Effect of the intervention on plasticisers on trade flows, EU vs Non-EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables General case Intra-EU VS RoW EU import VS RoW EU export VS RoW
Intra-EU trade -0.3404** -0.5330***
(0.1659) (0.1934)
EU import -0.6691*** -0.5587***
(0.1641) (0.1947)
EU export -0.3359** -0.2619*
(0.1394) (0.1436)
Linear combination -1.345***
(0.353)
Observations 19,199 11,791 9,600 13,806
Number of ij couples 2,846 1,779 1,706 2,224
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Intra-EU trade: importer
and exporter both belong to the EU. EU import: the importer is a EU country and the exporter is a
non-EU country. EU export: the importer is a non-EU country and the exporter is a EU country. RoW:
neither the importer nor the exporter belong to the EU.
Columns 2–4 report the same coefficients as Column 1, except that these are estimated unconditional on
other types of trade, thus not considering potential substitution between trading partners. Coefficients remain
negative and highly significant and are comparable to the ones shown in Column 1.
The development of the impact on trade involving EU Member States over time is illustrated in Figure 3,
which shows the yearly estimated linear combination of the coefficients reported in Column 1 of Table 3. When
comparing trade of EU Member States to that where only non-EU countries are involved, the plots clearly
documents the existence of a parallel trend in the pre-1999 period, as all coefficients are well aligned on the
zero line, and confirms the fall in trade volumes that emerged in Figure 2, which continues to be visible also in
this case. Supporting the existence of parallel trade trends between Europe and the Rest of the World, Figure 3
suggests that indeed the regulatory action enacted in 1999 did change the dynamics of the global plasticiser
trade flows, owing to the gradual phaseout of this material in Europe.
Figure 3: Effect of the intervention on plasticisers trade flows, EU vs Non-EU
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Note: The y axis expresses the difference in trade flows relative to the year before the
implementation of the intervention (1998). Black dots are the yearly point estimates,
computed as the linear combination of intra-EU, EU import and EU export; the vertical
lines represent the respective confidence intervals at 95% level. The vertical dashed
lines identify the year of enforcement of the various interventions.
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Additional evidence of the decreasing plasticisers trade flows can be found when considering flows of the
functional material which encompasses most intermediate goods that contain the plasticiser.13 Data for this
outcome are only available starting from 2002, that is after the entry into force of the 1999 intervention.
For this reason, it is not possible to attribute a causal connotation to the relationship between the regulatory
intervention of 1999 and the trends in trade flows for this commodity. Yet, Figure 4 supports the results shown
above by giving descriptive evidence of a decreasing trend in trade flows of the functional material involving EU
countries, which closely follows the patterns observed for the input (i.e. plasticiser) in Figure 3.
Figure 4: Effect of the intervention on plasticisers on functional material trade flows, EU vs Non-EU
-4
-2
0
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
Year
Note: The y axis expresses the difference in trade flows relative to the first year
available (2002). Black dots are the yearly point estimates, computed as the linear
combination of intra-EU, EU import and EU export; the vertical lines represent the
respective confidence intervals at 95% level. The vertical dashed lines identify the
year of enforcement of the various interventions.
13 This corresponds to code 392043 (Plastics; polymers of vinyl chloride, containing by weight not less than 6% of plasticisers; plates,
sheets, film, foil and strip (not self-adhesive), non-cellular and not reinforced, laminated, supported or similarly combined with other
materials) in the UN COMTRADE database.
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6 The impact of the ban on 3-BC use
3-Benzylidene camphor (3-BC) is a UV filter which has been mostly used in sunscreens and other whitening
skin care cosmetic products. It poses serious risk for human health because of its estrogen adverse effect.
Moreover, wildlife is exposed to the substance through down-the-drain emissions and the scientific literature
has demonstrated that this exposure impairs the reproduction of aquatic species.14
The regulatory framework dealing with the risks presented by chemicals in cosmetic preparations is the
Cosmetic Products Regulation (CR). It dates back to 1978, and it was meant to regulate the use of dangerous
substances in cosmetics by limiting the use of certain chemicals proven to be harmful for the human health. UV
filters allowed for use in cosmetic products are listed in Annex VI of the regulation. In 2015 3-BC was removed
from Annex VI, thus prohibiting its use in cosmetics, including the export and the import of cosmetics containing
it.15
Differently from the phthalates case, the sharp intervention on the 3-BC clearly splits the time interval
between 1999 and 2018 in two periods, that is, before and after the 2015 intervention. This set up enables the
straightforward implementation of a DiD model, and therefore it allows a causal interpretation of the estimates.
Here, the commodity chosen as the affected one is “Cosmetic and toilet preparations”, while the comparison
commodity is “Oral and dental hygiene preparations”.16 The rationale for selecting such commodity is that it
belongs to the same broader category as the treated good (that is, cosmetic and toilet preparations) but it
excludes products containing UV filters.
In what follows, an overview of the data is presented. Then, the results concerning the first scenario are
shown. Here, intra-EU trade flows of cosmetic and dental preparations are compared to each other before and
after the entry into force of the Regulation. Finally, the results deriving from the second scenario are displayed,
where world-wide flows of cosmetic products are considered and trade involving EU countries is compared to
trade among non-EU countries.
6.1 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics provided by Table 4 show that both the yearly average value of trade flows within ij
country pairs as well as the number of transactions (N ) have been increasing in the years immediately before
the ban of the 3-BC. Total trade value dynamics presented in Figure 5 are coherent with average figures.
As in the phthalates case, it is interesting to look into the major trade partners of European countries. By
2014, the trade of cosmetic preparations happened mostly within Europe itself with 82.6% of the overall value
Figure 5: Cosmetic preparations: trade flows trend
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14 See: ECHA (2016). REACH registry of SVHC intentions until outcome (3-BC). Retrievable from: https://echa.europa.eu/registry-of-svhc-
intentions/-/dislist/details/0b0236e180e4b445; SCCS 2013 Opinion on 3-BC. Retrievable from: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/1c6a44ae-b016-4c78-b5c1-e03e607734e7/language-en
15 It should be noted that, with regard to Annex VI (UV filters positive list), 9 amendments were put in force since 2013. These include 3
additions and 6 modifications of existing entries (e.g., lowering concentration limits). However, 3-BC is the only case of substance removed
from the Annex since 2013.
16 These correspond, respectively, to UN COMTRADE code 330499 “Cosmetic and toilet preparations; n.e.c. in heading no. 3304, for the
care of the skin (excluding medicaments, including sunscreen or sun tan preparations)” and to UN COMTRADE code 3306 “Oral and dental
hygiene preparations; preparations for oral or dental hygiene, including denture fixative pastes and powders; yarn used to clean between
the teeth (dental floss), in individual retail packages”.
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Table 4: Pre-3-BC ban trade values of cosmetic preparations
2010 2012 2014
Mean Sd N Mean Sd N Mean Sd N
Intra-EU trade 9301.9 33549.5 662 8849.6 33074.6 703 10385.9 37731.0 705
EU import 1693.7 11871.4 953 1685.0 12173.5 1033 1991.3 14790.8 1115
EU export 3204.1 19878.8 1456 4188.5 24369.9 1486 4906.0 31368.8 1589
Rest of the World trade 2036.4 14814.2 2752 2693.7 19017.5 2841 3042.0 21755.5 2951
Note: figures refer to ij yearly averages and are expressed in thousands of US dollars.
exchanged among EU Member States. In 2017, this percentage only slightly changed to 81.7%. Additionally, in
2014 the first three non-European trade partners were the USA, China and Japan. In 2017 the USA and China
maintained their position, whilst the Republic of Korea substituted Japan.
6.2 First scenario: 3-BC ban-affected commodities and non 3-BC ban-affected
commodities, intra-EU trade flows
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of the model where within-EU trade flows of both CR-affected
and non-affected commodities are considered.17 This corresponds to the specification outlined in Section 4.1.
Table 5: Effect of regulatory intervention on 3-BC on intra-EU trade flows, affected vs non affected commodities
(1)
Variables Ln(trade value in USD)
Cosmetics Regulation 0.1969**
(0.0803)
Observations 9,976
Number of ijc combinations 1,362
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
Figure 6: Effect of regulatory intervention on 3-BC on intra-EU trade flows, affected vs non affected commodities
-.6
-.3
0
.3
.6
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2017 2018
Year
Note: The y axis expresses the difference in trade flows relative to the year
before the implementation of the intervention (2015). Black dots are the yearly
point estimates, computed as the linear combination of intra-EU, EU import
and EU export; the vertical lines represent the respective confidence intervals
at 95% level. The vertical dashed line identifies the year of enforcement of
the 3-BC ban (2015).
17 For the full list of estimates, which are all in line with the predictions of economic theory, see Table 10 in Section 8
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The coefficient associated to the indicator for the enactment of the regulatory intervention suggests that
trade flows of the commodity affected by it increase significantly by around 20% due to the 2015 restriction,
compared to the commodities not directly affected by the intervention.
Figure 6 displays the yearly estimated effect corresponding to the coefficient presented in Table 6. In the
pre-intervention period, all coefficients are aligned on the zero line, suggesting the existence of a parallel trend
in trade flows of the two commodities. Only one coefficient (namely, the one referred to 2012) deviates from
this pattern possibly due to the unilateral ban on 3-BC introduced by France in that year. Yet, the confidence
intervals corresponding to this coefficient suggest that this is not statistically different from zero.18 As far as
the post-2015 years, the point estimates imply a gradual increase in the value of the intra-EU trade flows of the
impacted commodities with respect to trade of control goods. This amounts to around 5% in 2016 and grows
to 19% in 2017 and to 25% in 2018.
6.3 Second scenario: 3-BC ban-affected commodities, EU vs Non-EU trade flows
Table 6 presents the results according to the second scenario, where only commodities affected by the inter-
vention are considered.19 This is the specification of the model outlined in Section 4.2.
Column 1 refers to the general case where all trade flows (intra-EU, to and from the EU and among extra-EU
countries) are considered, with a sample of around 10, 000 pairs of countries. The reported coefficients suggest
the following. First, with respect to the trade flows among non-EU countries, the value of the intra-EU trade
of impacted commodities increases by around 34% due to the intervention, conditional on the import and the
export that EU countries have with non-European partners.
Second, conditional on the flows exchanged within the EU, the value of the goods EU countries import from
the rest of the world and the value of those that EU countries export to non-EU partners does not seem to be
affected by the intervention, as the estimates are not statistically different from zero. However, the signs of
the coefficients are coherent with the existence of a EU-wide ban. Thus, import flows seems to have slightly
decreased, as certain products containing 3-BC can no longer be introduced within the EU starting from 2016.
As exports are concerned, the estimated coefficient implies a slight increase in trade flows, which might be due
to an overall increase in the volume of the affected commodities produced within the EU and a consequent
increase in supply of these goods following the intervention.
Third, the linear combination of the three coefficients is positive and statistically significant at 1% level,
implying an increase in the overall trade for EU countries by 34% in comparison to non-EU trade for the same
commodities.
Table 6: Effect of regulatory intervention on 3-BC on trade flows, EU vs Non-EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables General case Intra-EU VS RoW EU import VS RoW EU export VS RoW
Intra-EU trade 0.2779*** 0.3434***
(0.0572) (0.0564)
EU import -0.0037 -0.0575
(0.0501) (0.0489)
EU export 0.0854** 0.0502
(0.0419) (0.0415)
Linear combination 0.3362***
(0.1086)
Observations 50,726 28,968 32,506 35,442
Number of ij couples 10,008 5,906 7,060 7,326
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Intra-EU trade: importer
and exporter both belong to the EU. EU import: the importer is a EU country and the exporter is a
non-EU country. EU export: the importer is a non-EU country and the exporter is a EU country. RoW:
neither the importer nor the exporter belong to the EU.
18 As a matter of fact, when trade flows to and from France are excluded from the sample, the coefficient associated to the year 2012
is closer to zero.
19 For the full list of estimates, which are all in line with the predictions of economic theory, see Table 11 in Section 8.
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Figure 7: Effect of regulatory intervention on 3-BC on trade flows, EU vs Non-EU
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Note: The y axis expresses the difference in trade flows relative to the year before the
implementation of the intervention (2015). Black dots are the yearly point estimates,
computed as the linear combination of intra-EU, EU import and EU export; the vertical
lines represent the respective confidence intervals at 95% level. The vertical dashed
line identifies the year of enforcement of the ban on 3-BC (2015).
While Column 1 considers all trade flows at once, columns 2–4 report the estimates where intra-EU, EU-to-
non-EU and non-EU-to-EU are considered one at a time, respectively, the baseline being extra-EU trade flows.
The number of observations, therefore, varies accordingly across the three columns. Reassuringly, the size and
the magnitude of the estimated coefficients are comparable to the ones reported in Column 1 in all three cases.
Figure 7 displays the yearly estimated effect as from the linear combination of the three coefficients reported
in Column 1 of Table 6. The plot confirms the existence of a parallel trend in the trade of the ban-affected
commodities across the group of EU countries (i.e. considering flows within the EU and to and from the EU,
altogether) and the pool of non-EU countries in the period preceding the entry into force of the intervention.
This is because the point estimates and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals cross the zero line in time
periods to the left of the vertical dashed line. Conversely, in the post-intervention years the estimated effect
is positive and statistically different from zero. This implies that the intervention induced an increase of 34%
circa in the trade flows experienced by EU countries in comparison to the trade flows existing among non-EU
countries. The pattern shown in the graph suggests that the increase was substantial in the first year after the
enactment of the regulation (32% in 2016) and that this persisted in the following years (39% in 2017 and 40%
in 2018).
Table 7 shows the result of three additional robustness checks. First, France introduced the ban on 3-BC
earlier compared to other EU countries. Therefore, in order to ensure that results are not driven by trade flows
to and from France, this is excluded from the sample (Column 1). Even in this case, results are coherent with
the main specification.
In the second column, the period considered spans from the year 2001 onwards. All three coefficients are
now significantly different from zero, however their magnitude is similar to the main specification’s one and the
overall conclusions remain unchanged. In fact, the linear combination of the three estimated coefficients implies
that the intervention yields an increase in the trade flows for EU countries by about 36%. Moreover, the plot of
the coefficients over time referred to this enlarged sample confirms a rise by 31% in 2016 and the persistence
of the increase in trade flows by around 40% in the following two years (Figure 8).
Finally, Column 3 refers to a balanced sample where only country pairs that are always observed in the
years 2010-2018 are retained. Here, the magnitude of the coefficients is lower due to the exclusion of some
positive values among the pool of extra-EU flows, which implies an underestimation of the overall effect. Yet,
the sign of the estimates is coherent with the main specification.
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Table 7: Effect of regulatory intervention on 3-BC on trade flows, EU vs Non-EU: robustness checks
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Without France Post-2001 sample Balanced sample
Intra EU trade 0.3545*** 0.4033*** 0.1729***
(0.0590) (0.0623) (0.0579)
EU import -0.0663 -0.1466*** -0.0076
(0.0505) (0.0528) (0.0572)
EU export 0.0524 0.1090** -0.0214
(0.0430) (0.0450) (0.0491)
Linear combination 0.3407*** 0.3658*** 0.1438
(0.1113) (0.1169) (0.1244)
Observations 48,745 90,060 25,587
Number of ij pairs 9,718 11,160 2,905
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Intra-EU trade: importer and exporter both belong to the EU. EU import: the
importer is a EU country and the exporter is a non-EU country. EU export: the
importer is a non-EU country and the exporter is a EU country. RoW: neither the
importer nor the exporter belong to the EU.
Figure 8: Effect of Cosmetics Regulation on trade flows, EU vs Non-EU: post-2001 sample
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2017 2018
Year
Note: The y axis expresses the difference in trade flows relative to the year before the
implementation of the intervention (2015). Black dots are the yearly point estimates,
computed as the linear combination of intra-EU, EU import and EU export; the vertical
lines represent the respective confidence intervals at 95% level. The vertical dashed
line identifies the year of enforcement of the ban on 3-BC (2015).
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7 Conclusions
This report provides an assessment of the potential unintended consequences that EU regulatory interventions
on EDs has had on trade patterns between European countries and the rest of the world. The analysis focuses on
two case studies and for this reason should be taken with some caution in generalizing the obtained results as
the impact of the Regulation on the whole market. The first case study concerns specifically the rules governing
the use of certain low-molecular weight phthalates as plasticisers in the production of plastics, which were
made increasingly stringent starting from 1999. The second evaluates the case of the 2015 ban on the use
of 3-BC as UV filter in cosmetic products (namely, sunscreens). The analysis combines a gravity model and a
Difference-in-Differences setting in order to obtain a causal interpretation of the obtained estimates.
The evidence on the interventions addressing the use of certain phthalates in plastics shows that these have
negatively and substantially affected the volume of traded plasticisers for EU Member States. This is true both
when the selected trade flows are compared to intra-EU exchanges of a specific comparison commodity that
does not contain phthalates (i.e. polyethylene polymer) and when they are confronted to trade flows occurring
among non-EU countries.
The analysis on the 3-BC ban under the Cosmetic Products Regulation, conversely, reveals that the interven-
tion has led to an increase in the amount of trade flows involving EU countries, at least on cosmetics containing
this substance. On the one hand, intra-EU trade flows of cosmetics increase significantly by around 20% due
to the intervention, compared to the non-affected commodity. On the other hand, the estimates suggest that
in comparison to extra-EU flows, the volume of cosmetics traded by EU countries has intensified substantially,
especially due to an increase in the exchanges among EU Member States and a rise in exports.
The two pieces of evidence presented in this report, coherently with the predictions of the economic theory,
suggest that the non-tariff measures put in place by the EU over the past decades to limit the use of EDs have
had the following repercussion on trade flows of the affected commodities.
First, as the analysis on phthalates suggests, they have green substantially decreased the amount of
plasticisers that are exchanged across the EU. Whether this has also had an effect on similar types of plastics
that do not contain phthalates (i.e. whether there has been substitution over products) cannot be in any way
assessed with the data at hand.
Second, the positive effect that the ban of 3-BC from cosmetics has had on this commodity is consistent with
the idea that EU-based producers have adjusted their production to the new standards therefore enhancing the
exchange of goods meeting higher safety standards. This is also qualitatively confirmed by a general shrinkage
of imports from non-EU countries and a rise in exports.
It should be noted that the classification of the commodities employed does not allow to exactly identify the
goods that are affected by the regulatory interventions under scrutiny. Yet, this makes the estimates likely to
correspond to a lower bound with respect to the ‘real’ ones.
Moreover, these results, although referred to the impact of regulatory interventions on two specific com-
modities only, provide an interesting first evidence of the impact of non-tariff measure on trade flows. Based
on this first attempt further studies may provide more comprehensive results (e.g., by extending the analysis to
a wider set of commodities affected by the regulations) on the whole market.
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8 Additional tables
Table 8: Effect of phthalate regulating interventions on intra-EU trade flows, affected vs non affected commodities: full
table
(1)
Variables ln(trade value in USD)
Regulation -2.4380***
(0.1507)
ln(GDPit) 1.1245***
(0.3814)
ln(GDPjt) -0.0404
(0.0512)
ln(Popit) -3.2005***
(0.8733)
ln(Popjt) 0.0526
(0.0568)
ln(Distanceij ) -0.4022**
(0.1775)
ln(Multilateral resistance termjt) -2.7439
(1.7471)
ln(Multilateral resistance termit) -1.3317***
(0.4574)
ln(Areai*Areaj ) 1.7277*
(0.9292)
D(Contiguityij ) 0.3738
(0.2688)
D(Common languageij ) -0.0192
(0.3648)
D(Common colonyij ) -0.1600
(0.3601)
D(Colony 1945ij ) -0.1012
(0.5645)
D(Current colonyij ) 0.5090
(0.6841)
Years of presence of ij couple 0.2576***
(0.0130)
Persistence of the ij couple 0.4304***
(0.0498)
Observations 13,226
Number of ijc combinations 1,142
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses.
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Table 9: Effect of phthalate regulating interventions on trade flows, EU vs Non-EU: full table
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables General case Intra-EU VS RoW EU import VS RoW EU export VS RoW
Intra-EU trade -0.3404** -0.5330***
(0.1659) (0.1934)
EU import -0.6691*** -0.5587***
(0.1641) (0.1947)
EU export -0.3359** -0.2619*
(0.1394) (0.1436)
ln(GDPit) 0.3514 0.4718 0.4181 -0.1420
(0.2147) (0.3022) (0.3056) (0.2686)
ln(GDPjt) 0.0164 0.0503 0.0079 0.0009
(0.0292) (0.0378) (0.0407) (0.0308)
ln(Popit) 0.6834* 0.7487* 1.3477*** 0.8560**
(0.3525) (0.4528) (0.4682) (0.3858)
ln(Popjt) -0.0323 -0.0302 -0.0320 -0.0072
(0.0314) (0.0398) (0.0436) (0.0327)
ln(Distanceij ) -0.2339*** -0.1486 -0.0422 -0.1481*
(0.0709) (0.0997) (0.0975) (0.0795)
ln(Multilateral resistance termjt) -1.1452 -0.7560 0.1678 -1.7875**
(0.7440) (1.0034) (1.0245) (0.8043)
ln(Multilateral resistance termit) 0.9034 0.8091 1.8278** 1.9890**
(0.5787) (0.6877) (0.8615) (0.8160)
ln(Areai*Areaj ) 0.0566 0.0222 -1.3171 0.2555
(0.1292) (0.1460) (1.6340) (0.1718)
D(Contiguityij ) 0.2515 0.2596 -0.1545 0.1275
(0.1536) (0.1625) (0.1847) (0.1734)
D(Common languageij ) -0.0471 -0.0676 -0.1699 -0.1730
(0.1301) (0.1647) (0.1671) (0.1385)
D(Common colonyij ) -0.0806 -0.0055 0.2102 0.0077
(0.1419) (0.2439) (0.2597) (0.1591)
D(Colony 1945ij ) -0.0107 -0.0425 0.1738 -0.1048
(0.1956) (0.2045) (0.2046) (0.1943)
D(Current colonyij ) -0.2049 1.5393 0.4383
(0.5479) (1.0912) (0.7045)
Years of presence of ij couple 0.1169*** 0.1221*** 0.1400*** 0.1269***
(0.0071) (0.0097) (0.0105) (0.0076)
Persistence of the ij couple 0.7974*** 0.8033*** 0.8598*** 0.7932***
(0.0459) (0.0605) (0.0647) (0.0523)
Linear combination -1.345***
(0.353)
Observations 19,199 11,791 9,600 13,806
Number of ij couples 2,846 1,779 1,706 2,224
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Intra-EU trade: importer and
exporter both belong to the EU. EU import: the importer is a EU country and the exporter is a non-EU country.
EU export: the importer is a non-EU country and the exporter is a EU country. RoW: neither the importer nor the
exporter belong to the EU.
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Table 10: Effect of Cosmetics Regulation on intra-EU trade flows, affected vs non affected commodities: full table
(1)
Variables Ln(trade value in USD)
Cosmetics Regulation 0.1969**
(0.0805)
ln(GDPit) -0.0106
(0.4063)
ln(GDPjt) -0.0323
(0.0393)
ln(Popit) -0.1436
(1.1045)
ln(Popjt) 0.0197
(0.0441)
ln(Distanceij ) -1.1072***
(0.1331)
ln(Multilateral resistance termjt) -3.8688
(3.3476)
ln(Multilateral resistance termit) 0.4830
(0.4650)
ln(Areai*Areaj ) 5.8275***
(1.8878)
D(Contiguityij ) 0.9732***
(0.1899)
D(Common languageij ) 0.6267**
(0.2645)
D(Common colonyij ) -0.0713
(0.2545)
D(Colony 1945ij ) 1.8936***
(0.3244)
D(Current colonyij ) 2.2063***
(0.7067)
Years of presence of ij couple 0.3251***
(0.0324)
Persistence of the ij couple 0.1973***
(0.0426)
Observations 9,976
Number of ijc combinations 1,362
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 11: Effect of Cosmetics Regulation on trade flows, EU vs Non-EU: full table
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables General case Intra-EU VS RoW EU import VS RoW EU export VS RoW
Intra-EU trade 0.3434*** 0.2779***
(0.0564) (0.0572)
EU import -0.0575 -0.0037
(0.0489) (0.0501)
EU export 0.0502 0.0854**
(0.0415) (0.0419)
ln(GDPit) 0.8576*** 0.6968*** 0.9914*** 0.9361***
(0.1859) (0.2467) (0.2372) (0.2297)
ln(GDPjt) -0.0139 -0.0005 -0.0074 -0.0085
(0.0162) (0.0214) (0.0200) (0.0192)
ln(Popit) -0.5718* -1.1386*** -0.6131 -0.7789**
(0.3102) (0.4099) (0.3993) (0.3495)
ln(Popjt) 0.0024 -0.0144 -0.0038 -0.0075
(0.0175) (0.0230) (0.0216) (0.0206)
ln(Distanceij ) -1.0835*** -0.8680*** -0.8567*** -0.8668***
(0.0366) (0.0540) (0.0476) (0.0472)
ln(Multilateral resistance termjt) 0.0386 -0.1602 -0.3197 0.1805
(0.4764) (0.5760) (0.5366) (0.5324)
ln(Multilateral resistance termit) 0.0600 -0.2313 -0.0098 -1.0293
(0.2752) (0.4962) (0.3228) (0.6336)
ln(Areai*Areaj ) 0.3681*** 0.4402 0.1784 0.2090
(0.1106) (1.0356) (0.1350) (0.1375)
D(Contiguityij ) 0.7697*** 0.7730*** 0.6338*** 0.5200***
(0.1328) (0.1418) (0.1705) (0.1647)
D(Common languageij ) 0.2218*** 0.2297** 0.1960** 0.2495***
(0.0770) (0.0901) (0.0852) (0.0843)
D(Common colonyij ) 0.4641*** 0.9314*** 0.5428** 1.0174***
(0.1428) (0.2924) (0.2195) (0.1993)
D(Colony 1945ij ) 0.4950*** 0.1704 0.2658*** 0.3406***
(0.0936) (0.1068) (0.1004) (0.0998)
D(Current colonyij ) 0.7075 1.7634*** 0.5100 -0.1518
(0.7445) (0.5851) (1.0369) (1.3900)
Years of presence of ij couple 0.3361*** 0.3727*** 0.3610*** 0.3781***
(0.0106) (0.0139) (0.0124) (0.0123)
Persistence of the ij couple 0.4875*** 0.4790*** 0.4803*** 0.4461***
(0.0329) (0.0445) (0.0391) (0.0379)
Linear combination 0.3362***
(0.1086)
Observations 50,726 28,968 32,506 35,442
Number of ij couples 10,008 5,906 7,060 7,326
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Intra-EU trade: importer and
exporter both belong to the EU. EU import: the importer is a EU country and the exporter is a non-EU country.
EU export: the importer is a non-EU country and the exporter is a EU country. RoW: neither the importer nor the
exporter belong to the EU.
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